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Abstract: 
Because they deal with issues of bodily integrity and health, the occupational health policies reveal 
the  contradictions  of  public  action  in  the  field  of  occupational  relationships,  and  the  fragile 
compromises to which they lead. This paper questions the difficulties related to the legitimisation of 
public policies in the field of workplace health. We analyse the reasons why these policies are 
difficult to legitimate and present an overview of the solutions that have been elaborated to answer 
this problem. The recent evolutions of public health policies, especially the arrival of new actors in 
traditional arenas of negotiation, tend to weaken these compromises and force actors to elaborate 
new modes of action. These evolutions should then be analysed by taking into account other public 
policies, in order to determine to what extent the management of occupational risks is undergoing 
the same transformations or if this field remains unaffected. 
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Résumé : 
Parce qu’elles touchent à l’intégrité corporelle et à la santé, les politiques de gestion du risque 
professionnel  sont  particulièrement  révélatrices  des  contradictions  de  l’action  publique  dans  le 
domaine  des  relations  professionnelles  et  des  compromis  toujours  fragiles  auxquels  elles 
aboutissent.  Ce  texte  propose  d’interroger  les  difficultés  liées  à  la  légitimation  des  politiques 
publiques menées dans le domaine de la santé au travail. Il analyse les raisons pour lesquelles ces 
politiques sont délicates à légitimer et met en évidence les solutions qui ont été élaborées pour 
répondre à cette difficulté. Les évolutions récentes des politiques de santé publique, notamment 
l’arrivée de nouveaux acteurs dans les arènes traditionnelles de négociations tendent à fragiliser ces 
compromis  et  contraignent  à  l’élaboration  de  nouveaux  modes  d’action.  Il  est  alors  intéressant 
d’analyser ces évolutions en perspective avec celles touchant l’ensemble des politiques publiques 
pour  voir  dans  quelle  mesure  la  gestion  des  risques  professionnels  est  soumise  aux  mêmes 
transformations ou s’il constitue un domaine à l’écart de ces évolutions. 
 
Mots-clés : politiques publiques, santé publique, santé au travail, publicité, légitimité.  
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Many recent studies in the field of political 
science
1  deal  directly  or  indirectly  with  the 
issue of the legitimisation of public policies. 
These  include  texts  discussing  the  issue  of 
democratic  deliberation
2  in  complement  to 
studies of political philosophy
3 and analyses 
of  the  innovative  mechanisms  of  citizen 
participation  in  decision-making  in  the 
framework  of  the  so-called  “technical 
democracy” (including Manin 1996). 
The aim of this article is to move beyond 
these questions by confronting them to a new 
area of public intervention. A lot of studies on 
deliberation or on technical democracy have 
been  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  policies  in 
which  the  issue  of  citizen  participation  in 
decision-making
4  arose  or  on  the  basis  of 
environmental  or  public  health  issues.
5  It  is 
therefore impossible to determine whether the 
mechanisms  analysed  depend  on  specific 
sectors of public action or if they represent a 
more general evolution of the latter. Applying 
these  questions  to  the  occupational  health 
sector  is  the  first  step  in  order  to  start 
answering them, as the analysis of the sector 
contradicts observations according to which a 
                                                 
1  Though  it  deals  with  all  legitimisation  processes 
related to governments and politicians, the fundamental 
text on these issues remains Lagroye 1985. 
2 See Politix 2002, and more recently Blondiaux 2008. 
3  The  books  which  best  sums  up  this  orientation  is 
Callon, Lascoumes, Barthe 2001. 
4  For  information  about  transport  infrastructure,  see 
Lolive 1999 and Blatrix 2002. 
5 See the studies about the  AIDS epidemic and as a 
synthesis, Dodier 2003. 
generalised  imperative  of  publicisation, 
discussion or deliberation of public decisions 
exists.
6  In  this  sector,  decisions  or 
adjudications tend not to be publicised in the 
social  space:  only  a  few  directly  concerned 
social groups follow these issues on a regular 
basis. 
In  contrast  to  the  prevailing  analyses,  the 
study of occupational health reveals the extent 
to which a society creates “shadow areas” in 
order to be in a position to carry on a certain 
number  of  activities.  Without  being 
deliberately  supported  by  all  the  agents 
involved in this process, these “shadow areas” 
are however necessary and are thus defended 
against  the  risk  of  a  reconsideration  of  the 
existing balances. The aim of the management 
of  occupational  hazards  is  to  set  an 
“acceptable” level of risk for workers, which 
inevitably raises the issue of the definition of 
an  “acceptable”  risk:  it  cannot  be  defined 
otherwise than as a socially accepted risk, i.e. 
justified  for  the  actors  involved  in  the 
decisional  process  of  its  definition,  and 
successfully  imposed  to  those  who  are 
subjected to its consequences. Thus this risk 
is first and foremost the result of a balance of 
power between the actors and groups of actors 
who have to define, accept or be subjected to 
it.  Public  actors  recognize  this  balance  of 
power  as  “regulation”.  However,  it  is 
problematic  to  announce  publicly  these 
                                                 
6 Even though some authors underline the ambiguity of 
these evolutions – see Lascoumes 2001.  
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decisions which admit the existence of a risk 
for  occupational  populations,  since  it  boils 
down  to  acknowledging  that  despite  the 
regulations  on  worker  protection,  certain 
categories of the population have less rights 
than others in terms of health. 
We posit the hypothesis that these choices can 
be  made  and  legitimised  precisely  because 
their implications are repressed and shielded 
from  the  public.  Indeed,  they  become 
illegitimate and unjustifiable in certain (rare) 
situations when occupational risks caused by 
toxic  products  such  as  asbestos  or  glycol 
ethers
7  (which  are  also  toxic  for  the 
environment) become highly publicised. 
Thus the frequent media coverage criticizing 
the  acceptance  of  workplace  risks  from  a 
social point of view shows that its legitimacy 
lies  partly  on  its  misrecognition.  After 
providing an analysis of the traditional paths 
of legitimisation of those public policies, we 
will study some of the current difficulties they 
face, owing to the increasing media coverage 
of some decisions. 
 
 
I - A discrete legitimisation 
 
1 The difficulty of legitimising the 
differential management of population 
health 
 
Though occupational health policies deal with 
public  health  issues,  they  have  traditionally 
been  associated  to  the  field  of  industrial 
relations and imply modes of action that are 
very  different  from  general  health  policies. 
Given  the  low  interest  of  health 
administrations  for  workplace  health  in 
France  and  the  division  of  competences 
between  the  Directorate  General  of  Health 
and  the  Directorate  General  of  Labour  (the 
latter  dealing  exclusively  with  all 
occupational  regulations)  it  is  legitimate  to 
wonder if this sector of intervention actually 
                                                 
7 On asbestos, see Henry 2007; on glycol ethers, see 
Jouzel 2006. 
is part of the public health field.
8 As with all 
occupational  issues (such  as  wage  levels  or 
working  hours),  one  of  the  main 
characteristics of workplace risk management 
is  the  necessity  for  the  different  agents 
involved  in  the  decision  process  (including 
trade union representatives and employers) to 
reach compromises. In the case of workplace 
health,  these  compromises  must  be  reached 
between  independent  values  that  may  have 
little  to  nothing  in  common  such  as  worker 
health  or  economic  viability  of  some 
industrial  sectors  or  even  job  consolidation. 
These are therefore delicate compromises, as 
they  pretty  much  depend  on  the 
hierarchisation  process  between  those 
different values, which in turn depends on the 
agents’  position,  on  the  interests  they  serve 
and on the hierarchies in force within other 
sectors of public action or society in general. 
The  fragility  of  these  compromises  impacts 
the legitimisation processes of these policies. 
The  most  widely  known  aspect  is  that  they 
aim  to  ensure  the  protection  of  workers, 
because  it  is  the  one  that  best  meets  the 
official imperatives of public health policies 
carried out in Western countries, i.e. ensuring 
population  protection.  However,  compared 
with  the  other  public  health  policies, 
occupational  health  policies  can  also  be 
analysed  as  a  part  of  the  differential 
management of population health. This means 
that  the  objectives  and  the  modalities  of 
public action in the field of public health are 
not  the  same  for  everyone  and  differ 
according to the status of the individuals, to 
the  circumstances  that  alter  their  health  or 
according  to  whoever  is  responsible  for  the 
degradation  of  their  health.  In  this  respect, 
workplace  health  policies  are  discriminatory 
policies  towards  employees,  who  are  placed 
in  situations  where  their  protection  is  lower 
than  that  of  other  individuals  who  are  not 
concerned by these policies. 
                                                 
8 This could also be applied to road safety because the 
Directorate-General of Health started tackling this issue 
only  recently,  judging  that  it  did  not  belong  to  its 
competence framework.  
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The  case  of  asbestos  regulations  shows  that 
workers  are  still  exposed  to  risk  situations. 
The  first  text  regulating  the  use  of  this 
carcinogenic  material  sets  the  maximum 
exposure  limit  at  2  fibres  per  cubic  meter 
(f/cm
3).  However,  this  maximal  exposition 
limit  which  reduces  risks  of  asbestosis,  a 
disease similar to silicosis, does not preclude 
the  possibility  of  carcinogenic  risks.
9  This 
limit  has  then  been  frequently  lowered  to 
reach 0,1f/cm
3 in 1996, i.e. 20 times less than 
the initial threshold. However, in spite of this 
reduction,  the  maximum  limit  still  induces 
theoretical  risks  of  lung  cancer  caused  by 
asbestos that are three times superior within 
workers populations than among other people 
who  have  been  exposed  to  the  maximal 
amounts  allowed  in  buildings  during  their 
entire  life.
10  The  analysis  of  maximum 
exposure  limits  to  all  occupational  toxic 
substances leads to the same conclusions: the 
policies  of  occupational  risk  prevention 
actually aim at managing the exposure to risks 
that  are  already  known.  This  is  clearly 
confirmed  by  the  ability  form  filled  by 
occupational  doctors  at  the  end  of  the 
worker’s  preliminary  health  inspection:  it 
attests  that  the  worker  “has  no  medical 
contraindication”  to  exposure  to  chemicals 
classified as carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic 
to reproduction (CMR).
11 
 
Experts are very familiar with this dimension 
of occupational health policies, but it remains 
however difficult to grasp for actors who have 
no particular reason to be interested in these 
questions. Indeed, as the articles on asbestos 
management  show,  the  general  press  never 
mentions this issue or only refers to it in terms 
of scandal or malfunction. The idea that the 
                                                 
9 “It has been acknowledged that this limit (2 fibres per 
cubic  meter)  is  applied  to  the  fibrogenic  effects  of 
asbestos and not to its carcinogenic effects, for which 
there is presently no data” (ILO 1974: 10).  
10 According to the studies of Inserm (National Institute 
for  Health  and  Medical  Research),  see  Goldberg, 
Hémon 1997: 233-237. 
11  See  article  12  of  the  decree  2001-57,  1  February 
2001, on CMRs. 
decisions  about  this  material  are  in  no  way 
exceptional compared with other occupational 
health policies never emerges either. 
 
2 Producing discretion: the creation of a 
non-problem 
 
Beyond  its  content,  the  elaboration  of  the 
regulation on the occupational use of asbestos 
highlights the importance of the role played 
by  employers  in  the  adoption  of  this 
regulation.  For  instance,  the  1977  decrees 
were  elaborated  only  when  industrials 
accepted a compromise. They understood that 
without  the  implementation  of  a  minimal 
regulation,  the  production  of  asbestos  itself 
could  be  threatened  following  strong 
mobilisations  in  the  1970s  and  their 
subsequent  media  coverage.  The  industrials 
decided  to  run  negotiations  on  this  issue 
within  an  institutional  framework,  thereby 
giving  an  advantage  to  employer 
representatives in the balance of power.
12 This 
strategy proved rather successful as between 
1977 and 1996, only two modifications were 
made to the 1977 decree, i.e. the adaptation of 
two  European  directives  to  French  law. 
Following the point of view of Peter Bachrach 
and  Morton  S.  Baratz,  we  may  talk  of 
“nondecision”  in  this  field  of  public  action. 
These two authors indeed suggest considering 
the  decisions  that  have  been  made  as  the 
result  of  power  relations,  but  also  of  the 
absence of decisions, i.e. nondecision: 
“But power is also exercised when A devotes 
his energies to creating or reinforcing social 
or political values and institutional practices 
that limit the scope of the political process to 
public  consideration  of  only  those  issues 
which are comparatively innocuous to A.”
13 
                                                 
12  For  information  on  the  processes  through  which 
employer representatives acquire this central position, 
see Déplaude 2003.  
13 Bachrach, Baratz 1962: 948. In this text, they clarify 
the  difference  between  the  power  manifested  by  a 
decision and that which imposes a non-decision: “ In 
the  one  case,  A  openly  participates;  in  the  other,  he 
participates only in the sense that he works to sustain  
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In  the  case  of  asbestos,  the  work  on  values 
and  modes  of  definition  of  the  problem  is 
perceptible, as the idea of “controlled use of 
asbestos” has been successfully imposed. This 
definition,  which  was  first  introduced  by 
industrials, is now used by all the actors who 
have  to  make  decisions  on  this  issue  and 
reveals  power  relations  where  industrials 
clearly  have  the  upper  hand.  This  situation 
and  the  policy-making  processes  remain 
hardly  visible.  Indeed,  political  and 
administrative  arbitrations  are  made  during 
technical  debates  within  specialized  para-
administrative  organisations  such  as  the 
Conseil  supérieur  de  prévention  des  risques 
professionnels  (CSPRP),  which  gathers 
representatives  of  syndicates  of  employees, 
employers  and  the  State.  The  debates  are 
therefore limited to the circles of specialists 
who  are  directly  involved  in  the  issues.  As 
these  decisions  depend  on  the  domain  of 
regulation  and  not  on  the  domain  of 
legislation, they have few opportunities to be 
widely  publicised,  and  are  therefore  not 
discussed  in  arenas  with  bigger  audiences, 
such as the Parliament. As a result, the actors 
involved  in  the  elaboration  of  these  norms 
belong  to  specialist  circles  and  form  a 
relatively limited group in which the position 
of  employers  remains  very  strong.  Besides, 
the fact that the State has invested very little 
in  the  monitoring  of  the  implementation  of 
those  regulations  helps  employers  to  keep 
their central role in the decisions. The number 
of labour inspectors (around 1400) compared 
with the number of workers (15 millions) or 
companies  (1,5  millions)  that  they  are 
supposed to control gives a good idea of this 
state of affairs (Ministère du Travail 2008). In 
practice,  employers  and  trade  union 
organisations  implement  and  control  the 
application  of  the  norms  on  occupational 
risks.  The  presence  of  trade  unions  within 
companies  therefore  plays  a  key  role  in  the 
implementation or the non-implementation of 
a text. 
                                                                            
those values and rules of procedures that help him keep 
certain issues out of the public domain”, ibid, note 11. 
Following  Peter  Bachrach  and  Morton  S. 
Baratz’s  research  about  “nondecisions”, 
occupational  risks  can  be  seen  as  a  non-
problem, i.e. a problem that many actors seek 
to  render  non-problematic.  Even  though 
numerous studies have shown that no problem 
is ever in itself a public or a political problem, 
but that it has to be constructed and carried by 
actors or social groups that work to constitute 
it as problematic, it is worth mentioning that 
the  importance  of  some  potentially 
problematic  issues  needs  to  be  constantly 
lessened, in order to avoid too much public 
attention (see also Cobb, Ross 1997). 
 
3 An invisible risk 
 
Among  the  elements  contributing  to  screen 
the  adverse  effects  of  workplace  health 
policies  and  thus  making  them  more 
acceptable, the modalities of reparation of the 
risks  play  a  key  role.  Indeed,  if  the 
management of workplace health consists in 
keeping risk levels “acceptable” for workers 
and if an acceptable risk is defined as a risk 
that is effectively  accepted, then it becomes 
necessary to consider the logic that enable a 
risk to be accepted by the populations who are 
subjected  to  it  without  raising  opposition  in 
other social spaces. The insurantialisation of 
occupational risks organised by the law of 9 
April  1898  for  occupational  accidents  and 
then extended to some occupational diseases 
by the law of 25 October 1919 is a factor that 
makes  this  acceptance  easier  (Ewald  1986). 
For many actors, occupational health is a risk 
managed by institutions whose role precisely 
is to indemnify a risk (especially since 1946, 
the ATMP – the branch of the French social 
security  in  charge  of  occupational  accidents 
and diseases). The importance of occupational 
accidents and diseases is effectively perceived 
mainly through the contribution rate set every 
year  by  the  Regional  Sickness  Insurance 
Funds  (CRAM)  for  enterprises.  Known  and 
socially  accepted  since  specific  institutions 
are  supposed  to  be  in  charge  of  it,  work-
related pain constitutes a factor among others 
in the organisation of production. Because of  
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the  generalization  of  the  financial  and 
insurantial logic, it turns out to be difficult to 
attribute a responsibility to one author. 
By  eliminating  the  notions  of  blame  and 
responsibility  from  the  recognition  and 
reparation processes, the system set up is both 
an insurance system and an instrument aiming 
at  normalising  and  imposing  the  ineluctable 
character of occupational risks. In this system, 
the industrials, producers of the risk, benefit 
from  a  situation  of  impunity.  First,  this 
situation  is  due  to  the  specific  rules  of  the 
code of social security, since a victim asking 
for  reparation  of  its  occupational  disease  or 
accident  cannot  obtain  an  additional 
indemnity in a civil court. It will only be the 
case  if  he  manages  to  have  the  employer’s 
inexcusable  fault  recognised  in  a  court  of 
social security affairs. Secondly, it is due to 
the modalities of the application of penal law 
in social matters and in particular to the very 
low  penalisation  of  the  violations  of  social 
law  (work  and  social  security  law),  making 
very  difficult  the  recourse  to  law  as  an 
element of transformation of these situations 
of  domination  (see  Serverin  1994:  654-662 
and Henry 2003-1: 39-59). In social law, the 
elision  of  the  responsibility  of  employers  is 
even  more  problematic  when  it  comes  to 
occupational accidents and diseases since the 
bodily security of employees is involved and 
the violations of the law may have irreversible 
consequences on their health.  
Moreover, most diseases are not recognized 
as occupational diseases even if they are the 
result of a professional activity.
14 Evaluating 
the  under-recognition  of  occupational 
diseases remains complex, since the only data 
available are communicated by social security 
funds, and only take into account cases that 
effectively  led  to  indemnification.  For 
instance, until the 1990s, every year, only a 
hundred  of  occupation-related  cancers  - 
according to epidemiologists, there are at least 
5000 such deaths per year (Imbernon 2002) - 
were  recognised  as  occupational  diseases. 
                                                 
14 Annie Thébaud-Mony’s study was the first to shed 
light on this issue (Thébaud-Mony 1991). 
Following  a  progressive  increase,  in  2001, 
1365 cancers were recognised, including 1149 
asbestos-related  ones.  This  only  concerns 
cancers  that  are  well  known  for  their 
occupational  origin,  such  as  leukeamia  or 
mesothelioma,  but  not  systematically,  and 
many other cancers have yet to be taken into 
account  (see  Saint-Jours  1995  and  the 
numbers released every year by the Ministry 
of  Work  during  the  CSPRP’s  plenary 
session).  This  lack  of  recognition  of 
occupational  diseases  contributes  to  making 
them even less visible. 
 
 
II - An increasingly precarious 
legitimacy 
 
The previously analysed logics which lead to 
the screening of these public policies can only 
be  fully  effective  if  they  are  completed  by 
powerful  domination  mechanisms  which 
contribute  to  the  confinement  of  pain  to 
dominated  social  groups  and  to  the 
localisation  of  the  discourses  on  this  pain 
within restricted social areas. Nevertheless, in 
spite  of  these  mechanisms,  several  current 
evolutions  jeopardise  this  situation  of 
acceptance and lack of knowledge on the long 
term.  This  weakening  is  first  due  to  the 
specific character of health compared with all 
the  other  dimensions  of  occupational  life, 
which  are  the  subject  of  negotiations  in  the 
field  of  professional  relations.  Indeed,  if  in 
lots  of  areas  of  labour  regulations  (such  as 
working  hours  or  wages),  compromises 
reached between trade unions and employers 
seem,  in  practice,  to  be  accepted  by  all  the 
actors  concerned,  they  appear  to  be  much 
more  problematic  when  it  comes  to  health. 
Can the physical integrity of employees be an 
element  among  others  when  social  partners 
negotiate?  Can  it  be  merged  with  other 
questions  of  public  health?  Historically, 
worker health has only been progressively the 
object of specific public intervention. Even if 
the first 19
th century social laws were meant 
to  protect  some  categories  of  workers  from  
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hard working conditions, rather than ensuring 
good health, they aimed more at guaranteeing 
their survival in the context of the imposition 
of  capitalism  to  the  first  generations  of 
workers (Supiot 1994 and Noiriel 1986). Only 
recently,  with  the  rise  of  health-related 
preoccupations in the population, has worker 
health  gotten  to  be  increasingly  difficult  to 
negotiate in discussions between social actors 
and the State. The compromise reached by the 
1898  law  on  the  compensation  of 
occupational accidents is part of 19
th century 
social history. Nowadays, this compromise is 
questioned  by  a  number  of  evolutions  both 
outside  and  within  the  risk  management 
sector.  How  does  an  old  system,  based  on 
solid  and  deeply  institutionalised 
compromises, react to pressures forcing it to 
become  more  similar  to  the  other  public 
health policies while the potential guidelines 
of a new organization are not yet clear? 
 
1 The increasing publicity on worker health 
issues 
 
This  weakening  comes  first  from  the 
increasing  publicity  on  occupational  health 
issues.  For  several  years  now,  occupational 
risks, which used to be dealt with in a very 
confidential  manner,  have  regularly  been 
exposed in the media. This evolution, which 
is  similar  to  the  evolution  of  other  health 
issues, happened at a different time and with a 
different  scope  for  occupational  health 
issues.
15 
The mass media coverage of asbestos can be 
considered  as  a  trigger  event.  Ever  since, 
some debates on the professional use of the 
most  well-known  chemicals  such  as  glycol 
ethers,  aluminium  and  lead  have  regularly 
arisen.  Some  pathologies  like  stress,  moral 
harassment
16  and  work-related 
musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) increasingly 
appear in the media. Even if this increasing 
                                                 
15 For information about general public health issues, 
see Girard, Eymeri 1998.  
16 See the success of Marie-France Hirigoyen’s book 
and the debates it sparked (Hirigoyen 1998).  
publicity is not always related to a growing 
interest in working conditions, it differentiates 
more and more distinctly from other sectors 
of State intervention in the public health field. 
As  these  policies  lean  on  a  high  level  of 
population  protection,  how  is  it  possible  to 
justify publicly that in the occupational field, 
workers are still subjected to significant risks? 
In  the  most  public  spaces,  no  one  takes 
responsibility for these difficult decisions; on 
the  opposite  avoidance  strategies  prevail, 
which tend to consider the problem publicised 
as  an  exception,  a  scandal  or  at  least  a 
mismanaged  problem  on  which  political 
actors  commit  themselves  to  take  the 
“necessary”  decisions.  Thus  asbestos  was 
essentially  problematised  in  terms  of 
“scandal”, to which political actors reacted by 
banning  the  product  (Henry  2003-2,  2004).
  
Similarly, some glycol ethers are still used in 
the  workplace  even  though  they  have  been 
banned for the general population. It is hard to 
understand for the broader public why the law 
is not the same for the professional sector and 
the  general  population.  These  differences 
enable  certain  actors  (like  trade  unions  and 
consumer  protection  groups)  to  use  this 
incomprehension  as  a  resource  in  order  to 
demand  the  ban  from  the  workplace  of 
products  that  have  already  been  banned  for 
the  general  population.
17  When  political 
actors make the same demands, it shows that 
they are not aware of the decisions that have 
been taken in these areas.
18 
                                                 
17  On  the  ban  on  glycol  ethers  in  occupational 
environments,  see  the  stances  of  the  French 
Democratic Confederation of Labour (CFDT) or that of 
the Federal Union of Consumers Que choisir. 
18  For  example,  Odette  Grzegrzulka  and  André 
Aschieri  question  in  a  parliamentary  report  on 
environmental  health  safety  the  differences  of 
treatment between these two intervention sectors: “The 
case  of  glycol  ethers  illustrates  the  difficulties  in 
constructing  a  homogeneous  preventive  policy:  4 
substances  from  this  family  have  been  classified  as 
“toxic to reproduction” by the European Union since 
1993. This classification results from the accumulation 
of epidemiologic and experimental data since 1979. In 
France,  the  use  of  these  4  substances  in  domestic 
products  was  only  limited  by  an  order  issued  on  7 
August 1997 (…). The public authorities have brought  
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Because  of  the  increasing  publicity,  new 
actors intervene in this process and bring new 
definitions of the problem. The most visible 
actors are the political actors and journalists. 
Since they know very little about workplace 
health  issues,  they  treat  them  like  the 
questions  of  public  health  that  they  know 
better.  They  also  bring  modalities  of 
definition of problems and goals informed by 
public  health  policies  for  the  general 
population,  thereby  invalidating  a  “risk 
management”  approach  which  implies  a 
pretty  clear  awareness  of  the  risks  workers 
incur (as shown by the latest Senate report on 
asbestos: Dériot, Godefroy 2005). Among the 
other actors that appear or are reinforced by 
these evolutions, there are associative actors – 
such as the national federation of persons who 
suffered  from  an  accident  at  work  and  the 
disabled  (Fnath)  or  the  national  association 
for the defence of asbestos victims (Andeva) 
–  who  use  the  contradictions  between 
workplace health and public health in order to 
further their cause. Their ability to point out 
the contradictions of public action, turn them 
into scandals and thereby force the authorities 
to  better  deal  with  workplace  health  issues 
results  from  a  strategic  use  of  these 
contradictions.
19  Political-administrative 
actors  are  perfectly  aware  of  the  risk  that 
these associations spread their points of view 
through the media and are therefore forced to 
take into account their vision of these issues 
or even to integrate them into certain arenas 
of negotiation. 
This  growing  publicity  around  occupational 
health  issues  is  accompanied  by  a 
                                                                            
the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  relevant  expert 
committees  (CSHPF,  CPP,  CSC,  CSPRP)  but  until 
now  have  not  been  able  to  work  out  a  strategy  for 
preventing risks related to glycol ethers, especially in 
cases of occupational exposure” (Grzegrzulka, Aschieri 
1999).  
19 Denis Duclos came to a similar conclusion on this 
point: “on this issue (maybe more than for other more 
traditional  objects  of  demand  in  the  trade  union 
struggles), the ‘big progress’ seems linked to the ability 
of the social movement as a whole to create ‘scandal 
effects’ involving combinations of very diverse actors” 
(Duclos 1984: 86).  
judiciarisation  that  increasingly  threatens 
officials  working  within  labour 
administrations.  As  the  judiciarisation  of 
public  health  issues  increases,  will  the 
administrative  leaders  of  the  Ministry  of 
Labour accept to mediate in compromises that 
maintain a level of risk for employees in spite 
of the recent jurisprudence of the Council of 
State, which seems to indicate that the State 
now  has  an  obligation  to  achieve  results 
(obligation  de  résultat).  in  the  regulation  of 
worker protection?
20 With this judiciarisation, 
occupational  risks  are  now  increasingly 
handled  on  the  same  way  as  health  of 
environmental risks. This can be seen in the 
rejection  of  the  old  regulation  imposing  to 
reach  compromises  with  employers 
(retrospectively  regarded  as  compromises  of 
principle)  or  through  the  increasing 
valorisation  of  independent  expertise  forms 
(such  as  the  collective  expertise  of  the 
Inserm)  at  the  expense  of  the  expertise 
implemented by social partners. 
 
2 Contradictory evolutions 
 
The increasing publicity around occupational 
health issues weakens the system of actors on 
which  those  policies  rely  and  changes  the 
constraints that frame their capacity of action. 
For  example,  the  imperative  of  potentially 
having  to  expose  publicly  the  reasons  for 
certain decisions that have been taken in the 
field of occupational health or that explain the 
outcome  of  certain  compromises  has  a 
considerable impact on the universe of these 
actors, which is normally limited to specialist 
circles.  In  contrast  to  the  field  of  public 
health, that has increasingly become a public 
concern  since  the  1980s,  the  field  of 
occupational health appears to some actors to 
be  “lagging  behind”  these  current 
transformations, so that it has been envisioned 
                                                 
20 See the judgement given by the Council of State on 
3 March 2004, stipulating that the State is responsible 
for  the  fact  that  the  1977  legislation  on  the 
occupational  use  of  asbestos  maintained  a  risk  for 
workers.  
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to have the procedures of intervention of the 
Ministry of Labour follow those used in the 
Ministry of Health. 
The  1998  creation  of  the  Department  of 
Health and Labour within the French Institute 
for Public Health Surveillance (InVS), under 
the exclusive guardianship of the Ministry of 
Health, constitutes the first element of these 
transformations.    Ever  since,  the  issue  of 
occupational risks has been handled by actors 
that institutionally and professionally depend 
on  the  field  of  public  health.  These  actors 
redefine  the  problem  based  on  their 
epidemiological competences and  attempt to 
assess  and  monitor  the  impact  of  the 
consequences  of  work  on  health  for  the 
general  population.  This  modality  of 
definition  of  the  workplace  health  issue 
constitutes  a  break  from  the  traditional 
approach,  rooted  in  the  companies’  social 
realities and aiming more directly at limiting 
occupational  hazards  or  at  implementing  a 
preventive policy. The sudden emergence of 
epidemiologists  and  more  generally  that  of 
new  approaches  to  public  health  issues 
objectivate the effects of work on population 
health  and  makes  the  increasing  publicity 
around  occupational  health  irreversible  by 
gradually  providing  more  and  more  (solid) 
data to quantify this issue. The transformation 
of the AFFSE into AFSSET (French agency 
of sanitary safety of environment and work) 
can  also  be  seen  as  the  importation  of 
approaches  that  characterised  public  health 
administrations,  i.e.  the  will  to  separate 
knowledge and management of risks with the 
creation  of  independent  expert 
organisations.
21 Though this creation enables 
the Ministry of Labour to regain some control 
over the expertise claimed by the InVS, it also 
implies  reconsidering  the  combination  of 
scientific  expertise,  social  negotiations  and 
the search for an autonomisation of expertise 
production. In the same way, the importance 
of  occupational  issues  in  the  National 
                                                 
21  For  information  on  the  constitution  of  agencies 
within  the  Ministry  of  Health,  see  Benamouzig, 
Besançon 2005.  
Environment  and  Health  Action  Plan 
implemented  in  2004  (Momas,  Caillard, 
Lesaffre 2003) shows that occupational health 
issues  are  handled  within  larger 
administrative and political spheres (including 
the  Ministries  of  Health  and  Environment) 
and  not  only  between  occupational  health 
specialists.  The  debates  around  the 
implementation  of  an  integral  compensation 
for occupational risks (which would call into 
question the compromise of the 1898 law that 
granted  an  automatic  compensation  on  a 
standardised  basis)  should  also  be  analysed 
from  this  perspective.  The  increasing 
difficulties to justify a specific compensation 
for  occupational  risks  question  its 
autonomous  management  and  favour  the 
importation  of  approaches  used  for  other 
types of risks. These debates take place at a 
time  when  the  system  of  compensation  for 
occupational diseases, based on charts listing 
activities  and  corresponding  diseases,  is  no 
longer  adapted,  since  occupational  diseases 
that  are  univocally  due  to  certain  toxic 
substances  or  to  certain  well  known  work 
processes have been taken into account. The 
evolution of the epidemiology of occupational 
risks  shows  more  and  more  diseases  which 
can be caused by several factors (lung cancer 
being  the  most  significant  example).  Those 
diseases do not fit within this system based on 
the  presence  or  the  absence  of  causalities 
between a specific occupational situation and 
the  onset  of  a  disease  and  thus  impose  to 
reach new agreements which, to this date, are 
not  quite  consensual  (Dorion,  Lenoir  1992). 
This  specific  compensation  system  is  also 
being reconsidered because in many cases, it 
presents  fewer  advantages  than  the  general 
health  insurance  system  in  terms  of 
compensations  or  than  specific  systems 
concerning  other  types  of  accidents  set  up 
since the mid-1980s, such as road  accidents 
(1985),  terrorist  acts  (1986),  infractions 
(1990),  blood  transfusion  (1991),  asbestos 
exposure (2001) or medical accidents (2002). 
The  integral  compensation  of  occupational 
risks  therefore  seems  increasingly  pressing  
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(Lyon-Caen  1990;  Masse,  Zeggar  2001  and 
Yahiel 2002). 
These  various  evolutions  in  the 
occupational  health  sector  jeopardise  the 
compromises on which State action is based. 
Therefore, new modes of public intervention 
are required, and finding them is hard as there 
is still no prevailing alternative management 
model  that  would  enable  a  global 
transformation  of  this  domain  of  activity. 
Reluctances  are  observed,  which  seek  to 
maintain the status quo of the existing system 
by keeping values, actors and power relations 
in relatively stable positions. 
First, concerning the internal rules of 
the  French  Directorate  General  of  Labour 
(DGT), a charter has been adopted in order to 
clarify  the  functioning  of  the  committees 
within the CSPRP, in particular by separating 
expertise and social negotiations, but it does 
not  seem  to  have  deeply  transformed  the 
power relations between different actors on all 
occupational risks. The existing disproportion 
between  employers  and  the  Ministry  (and 
trade  union  organisations)  in  the  ability  to 
mobilise  expertise  remains,  for  instance,  a 
structural  element  that  prevents  any  durable 
modification in the power relations (Déplaude 
2003). 
Secondly,  though  certain  logics 
increase  the  risk  of  publicisation  of  public 
health  issues  (through  the  emergence  of 
associative actors or the increasing publicity 
around health issues provided in the media), 
the  situation  is  far  from  having  completely 
changed within the DGT, which proves to be 
very  little  affected  by  the  processes  of 
publicisation  of  issues  (Henry  2004).  The 
functioning of the Ministry remains based on 
the search for compromises between various 
actors  taking  part  in  the  negotiations,  the 
strong European integration of the regulation 
and  the  relative  lack  of  interest  of  political 
actors  regarding issues that remain confined 
to the administrative space.  
Finally,  this  preservation  of  existing 
practices can also be observed on the level of 
the  actors  involved  (i.e.  unionists,  employer 
organizations,  civil  servants  working  in 
central administrations), who, as a rule, do not 
seek to publicise the issues they deal with in 
these arenas or, due to their highly technical 
character,  anticipate  the  difficulty  in 
translating  these  questions  into  broader  and 
more open spaces of public debates. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The  contradictions  between  the  increasing 
imperatives of transformation inherent to this 
intervention  sector  and  the  considerable 
obstacles to these evolutions seem to be the 
result of the modern management system of 
occupational risks. On the one hand, from the 
point of view of the general population, this 
sector  of  public  action  cannot  completely 
function based on the same logics as those of 
the health sector for the general population – 
the  existence  of  some  industrial  sectors 
requires a higher level of risk for workers. On 
the  other  hand,  the  preservation  of  existing 
logics  apart  from  the  parallel  evolutions  in 
sectors  of  public  actions  is  not  conceivable. 
These contradictions allow for the analysis of 
the  introduction  of  new  legitimisation 
processes of public policies, which are based 
on  a  greater  transparency  of  decision 
processes,  a  greater  publicity  of  the  debates 
that lead to decisions and the association of 
actors concerned by the effects of a specific 
policy.  As  of  now,  it  appears  difficult  to 
assess whether this evolution tends to spread 
to  all  State  intervention  sectors  or  if, 
conversely,  a  strong  inter-sectoral 
differentiation  will  durably  remain. 
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